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ABSTRACT
Fabric is amodular and extensible open-source system for deploying
and operating permissioned blockchains and one of theHyperledger
projects hosted by the Linux Foundation (www.hyperledger.org).
Fabric is the first truly extensible blockchain system for running
distributed applications. It supports modular consensus protocols,
which allows the system to be tailored to particular use cases and
trust models. Fabric is also the first blockchain system that runs
distributed applications written in standard, general-purpose pro-
gramming languages, without systemic dependency on a native
cryptocurrency. This stands in sharp contrast to existing block-
chain platforms that require “smart-contracts” to be written in
domain-specific languages or rely on a cryptocurrency. Fabric real-
izes the permissioned model using a portable notion of membership,
which may be integrated with industry-standard identity manage-
ment. To support such flexibility, Fabric introduces an entirely novel
blockchain design and revamps the way blockchains cope with non-
determinism, resource exhaustion, and performance attacks.
This paper describes Fabric, its architecture, the rationale be-
hind various design decisions, its most prominent implementation
aspects, as well as its distributed application programming model.
We further evaluate Fabric by implementing and benchmarking
a Bitcoin-inspired digital currency. We show that Fabric achieves
end-to-end throughput of more than 3500 transactions per second
in certain popular deployment configurations, with sub-second
latency, scaling well to over 100 peers.
∗Work done at IBM.
© Copyright held by the owner/author(s).
1 INTRODUCTION
A blockchain can be defined as an immutable ledger for recording
transactions, maintained within a distributed network of mutually
untrusting peers. Every peer maintains a copy of the ledger. The
peers execute a consensus protocol to validate transactions, group
them into blocks, and build a hash chain over the blocks. This
process forms the ledger by ordering the transactions, as is neces-
sary for consistency. Blockchains have emerged with Bitcoin [3]
and are widely regarded as a promising technology to run trusted
exchanges in the digital world.
In a public or permissionless blockchain anyone can participate
without a specific identity. Public blockchains typically involve a
native cryptocurrency and often use consensus based on “proof of
work” (PoW) and economic incentives. Permissioned blockchains,
on the other hand, run a blockchain among a set of known, iden-
tified participants. A permissioned blockchain provides a way to
secure the interactions among a group of entities that have a com-
mon goal but which do not fully trust each other, such as businesses
that exchange funds, goods, or information. By relying on the iden-
tities of the peers, a permissioned blockchain can use traditional
Byzantine-fault tolerant (BFT) consensus.
Blockchains may execute arbitrary, programmable transaction
logic in the form of smart contracts, as exemplified by Ethereum [5].
The scripts in Bitcoin were a predecessor of the concept. A smart
contract functions as a trusted distributed application and gains
its security from the blockchain and the underlying consensus
ar
X
iv
:1
80
1.
10
22
8v
2 
 [c
s.D
C]
  1
7 A
pr
 20
18
among the peers. This closely resembles the well-known approach
of building resilient applications with state-machine replication
(SMR) [48]. However, blockchains depart from traditional SMR with
Byzantine faults in important ways: (1) not only one, but many
distributed applications run concurrently; (2) applications may be
deployed dynamically and by anyone; and (3) the application code is
untrusted, potentially even malicious. These differences necessitate
new designs.
Many existing smart-contract blockchains follow the blueprint
of SMR [48] and implement so-called active replication [27]: a pro-
tocol for consensus or atomic broadcast first orders the transactions
and propagates them to all peers; and second, each peer executes
the transactions sequentially. We call this the order-execute archi-
tecture; it requires all peers to execute every transaction and all
transactions to be deterministic. The order-execute architecture can
be found in virtually all existing blockchain systems, ranging from
public ones such as Ethereum (with PoW-based consensus) to per-
missioned ones (with BFT-type consensus) such as Tendermint [14],
Chain [4] and Quorum [13]. Although the order-execute design is
not immediately apparent in all systems, because the additional
transaction validation step may blur it, its limitations are inherent
in all: every peer executes every transaction and transactions must
be deterministic.
Prior permissioned blockchains suffer from many limitations,
which often stem from their permissionless relatives or from using
the order-execute architecture. In particular:
• Consensus is hard-coded within the platform, which con-
tradicts the well-established understanding that there is no
“one-size-fits-all” (BFT) consensus protocol [52];
• The trust model of transaction validation is determined by
the consensus protocol and cannot be adapted to the require-
ments of the smart contract;
• Smart contracts must be written in a fixed, non-standard, or
domain-specific language, which hinders wide-spread adop-
tion and may lead to programming errors;
• The sequential execution of all transactions by all peers limits
performance, and complex measures are needed to prevent
denial-of-service attacks against the platform originating
from untrusted contracts (such as accounting for runtime
with “gas” in Ethereum);
• Transactions must be deterministic, which can be difficult to
ensure programmatically;
• Every smart contract runs on all peers, which is at odds with
confidentiality, and prohibits the dissemination of contract
code and state to a subset of peers.
In this paper we describe Hyperledger Fabric or simply Fabric,
an open-source [8] blockchain platform that overcomes these limi-
tations. Fabric is one of the projects of Hyperledger [7] under the
auspices of the Linux Foundation [11]. Fabric is used in more than
400 prototypes, proofs-of-concept, and in production distributed-
ledger systems, across different industries and use cases. These use
cases include but are not limited to areas such as dispute resolu-
tion, trade logistics, FX netting, food safety, contract management,
diamond provenance, rewards point management, low liquidity
securities trading and settlement, identity management, and settle-
ment through digital currency.
Fabric introduces a new blockchain architecture aiming at re-
siliency, flexibility, scalability, and confidentiality. Designed as
a modular and extensible general-purpose permissioned block-
chain, Fabric is the first blockchain system to support the exe-
cution of distributed applications written in standard programming
languages, in a way that allows them to be executed consistently
across many nodes, giving impression of execution on a single
globally-distributed blockchain computer. This makes Fabric the
first distributed operating system [54] for permissioned blockchains.
The architecture of Fabric follows a novel execute-order-validate
paradigm for distributed execution of untrusted code in an un-
trusted environment. It separates the transaction flow into three
steps, which may be run on different entities in the system: (1) exe-
cuting a transaction and checking its correctness, thereby endorsing
it (corresponding to “transaction validation” in other blockchains);
(2) ordering through a consensus protocol, irrespective of trans-
action semantics; and (3) transaction validation per application-
specific trust assumptions, which also prevents race conditions due
to concurrency.
This design departs radically from the order-execute paradigm
in that Fabric typically executes transactions before reaching fi-
nal agreement on their order. It combines the two well-known
approaches to replication, passive and active, as follows.
First, Fabric uses passive or primary-backup replication [21, 27]
as often found in distributed databases, but with middleware-based
asymmetric update processing [40, 41] and ported to untrusted
environments with Byzantine faults. In Fabric, every transaction is
executed (endorsed) only by a subset of the peers, which allows for
parallel execution and addresses potential non-determinism, draw-
ing on “execute-verify” BFT replication [37]. A flexible endorsement
policy specifies which peers, or how many of them, need to vouch
for the correct execution of a given smart contract.
Second, Fabric incorporates active replication in the sense that
the transaction’s effects on the ledger state are only written after
reaching consensus on a total order among them, in the determinis-
tic validation step executed by each peer individually. This allows
Fabric to respect application-specific trust assumptions according
to the transaction endorsement. Moreover, the ordering of state
updates is delegated to a modular component for consensus (i.e.,
atomic broadcast), which is stateless and logically decoupled from
the peers that execute transactions and maintain the ledger. Since
consensus is modular, its implementation can be tailored to the
trust assumption of a particular deployment. Although it is readily
possible to use the blockchain peers also for implementing consen-
sus, the separation of the two roles adds flexibility and allows one
to rely on well-established toolkits for CFT (crash fault-tolerant) or
BFT ordering.
Overall, this hybrid replication design, which mixes passive and
active replication in the Byzantine model, and the execute-order-
validate paradigm, represent the main innovation in Fabric archi-
tecture. They resolve the issues mentioned before and make Fabric
a scalable system for permissioned blockchains supporting flexible
trust assumptions.
To implement this architecture, Fabric contains modular building
blocks for each of the following components:
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• An ordering service atomically broadcasts state updates to
peers and establishes consensus on the order of transactions.
• A membership service provider is responsible for associating
peers with cryptographic identities. It maintains the permis-
sioned nature of Fabric.
• An optional peer-to-peer gossip service disseminates the blocks
output by ordering service to all peers.
• Smart contracts in Fabric run within a container environment
for isolation. They can be written in standard programming
languages but do not have direct access to the ledger state.
• Each peer locally maintains the ledger in the form of the
append-only blockchain and as a snapshot of the most recent
state in a key-value store.
The remainder of this paper describes the architecture of Fabric
and our experience with it. Section 2 summarizes the state of the
art and explains the rationale behind various design decisions. Sec-
tion 3 introduces the architecture and the execute-order-validate
approach of Fabric in detail, illustrating the transaction execution
flow. In Section 4, the key components of Fabric are defined, in par-
ticular, the ordering service, membership service, peer-to-peer gos-
sip, ledger database, and smart-contract API. Results and insights
gained in a performance evaluation of Fabric with a Bitcoin-inspired
cryptocurrency, deployed in a cluster and WAN environments on
commodity public cloud VMs, are given in Section 5. They show that
Fabric achieves, in popular deployment configurations, throughput
of more than 3500 tps, achieving finality [57] with latency of a few
hundred ms and scaling well to over 100 peers. In Section 6 we
discuss a few real production use cases of Fabric. Finally, Section 7
discusses related work.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Order-Execute Architecture for
Blockchains
All previous blockchain systems, permissioned or not, follow the
order-execute architecture. This means that the blockchain net-
work orders transactions first, using a consensus protocol, and then
executes them in the same order on all peers sequentially.1
For instance, a PoW-based permissionless blockchain such as
Ethereum combines consensus and execution of transactions as
follows: (1) every peer (i.e., a node that participates in consensus) as-
sembles a block containing valid transactions (to establish validity,
this peer already pre-executes those transactions); (2) the peer tries
to solve a PoW puzzle [44]; (3) if the peer is lucky and solves the
puzzle, it disseminates the block to the network via a gossip proto-
col; and (4) every peer receiving the block validates the solution to
the puzzle and all transactions in the block. Effectively, every peer
thereby repeats the execution of the lucky peer from its first step.
Moreover, all peers execute the transactions sequentially (within
one block and across blocks). The order-execute architecture is
illustrated by Fig. 1.
Existing permissioned blockchains such as Tendermint, Chain, or
Quorum typically use BFT consensus [24], provided by PBFT [26] or
other protocols for atomic broadcast. Nevertheless, they all follow
1In many blockchains with a hard-coded primary application, such as Bitcoin,
this transaction execution is called “transaction validation.” Here we call this step
transaction execution to harmonize the terminology.
Update stateOrder Execute
● Deterministic (!)
execution
● Persist state on 
all peers
● Consensus or 
atomic broadcast
Figure 1: Order-execute architecture in replicated services.
the same order-execute approach and implement classical active
SMR [27, 48].
2.2 Limitations of Order-Execute
The order-execute architecture is conceptually simple and therefore
also widely used. However, it has several drawbacks when used in
a general-purpose permissioned blockchain. We discuss the three
most significant ones next.
Sequential execution. Executing the transactions sequentially on
all peers limits the effective throughput that can be achieved by
the blockchain. In particular, since the throughput is inversely pro-
portional to the execution latency, this may become a performance
bottleneck for all but the simplest smart contracts. Moreover, recall
that in contrast to traditional SMR, the blockchain forms a universal
computing engine and its payload applications might be deployed
by an adversary. A denial-of-service (DoS) attack, which severely
reduces the performance of such a blockchain, could simply in-
troduce smart contracts that take a very long time to execute. For
example, a smart contract that executes an infinite loop has a fatal
effect, but cannot be detected automatically because the halting
problem is unsolvable.
To cope with this issue, public programmable blockchains with a
cryptocurrency account for the execution cost. Ethereum [58], for
example, introduces the concept of gas consumed by a transaction
execution, which is converted at a gas price to a cost in the cryp-
tocurrency and billed to the submitter of the transaction. Ethereum
goes a long way to support this concept, assigns a cost to every
low-level computation step, introducing its own VM for controlling
execution. Although this appears to be a viable solution for public
blockchains, it is not adequate in the permissioned model for a
general-purpose system without a native cryptocurrency.
The distributed-systems literature proposes many ways to im-
prove performance compared to sequential execution, for instance
through parallel execution of unrelated operations [46]. Unfortu-
nately, such techniques are still to be applied successfully in the
blockchain context of smart contracts. For instance, one challenge
is the requirement for deterministically inferring all dependencies
across smart contracts, which is particularly challenging when com-
bined with possible confidentiality constraints. Furthermore, these
techniques are of no help against DoS attacks by contract code from
untrusted developers.
Non-deterministic code. Another important problem for an order-
execute architecture are non-deterministic transactions. Operations
executed after consensus in active SMR must be deterministic, or
the distributed ledger “forks” and violates the basic premise of a
blockchain, that all peers hold the same state. This is usually ad-
dressed by programming blockchains in domain-specific languages
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(e.g., Ethereum Solidity) that are expressive enough for their ap-
plications but limited to deterministic execution. However, such
languages are difficult to design for the implementer and require
additional learning by the programmer. Writing smart contracts
in a general-purpose language (e.g., Go, Java, C/C++) instead ap-
pears more attractive and accelerates the adoption of blockchain
solutions.
Unfortunately, generic languages pose many problems for en-
suring deterministic execution. Even if the application developer
does not introduce obviously non-deterministic operations, hidden
implementation details can have the same devastating effect (e.g., a
map iterator is not deterministic in Go). To make matters worse,
on a blockchain the burden to create deterministic applications lies
on the potentially untrusted programmer. Only one non-determin-
istic contract created with malicious intent is enough to bring the
whole blockchain to a halt. A modular solution to filter diverging
operations on a blockchain has also been investigated [23], but it
appears costly in practice.
Confidentiality of execution. According to the blueprint of public
blockchains, many permissioned systems run all smart contracts
on all peers. However, many intended use cases for permissio-
ned blockchains require confidentiality, i.e., that access to smart-
contract logic, transaction data, or ledger state can be restricted.
Although cryptographic techniques, ranging from data encryption
to advanced zero-knowledge proofs [18] and verifiable computa-
tion [42], can help to achieve confidentiality, this often comes with
a considerable overhead and is not viable in practice.
Fortunately, it suffices to propagate the same state to all peers
instead of running the same code everywhere. Thus, the execution
of a smart contract can be restricted to a subset of the peers trusted
for this task, that vouch for the results of the execution. This de-
sign departs from active replication towards a variant of passive
replication [21], adapted to the trust model of blockchain.
2.3 Further Limitations of Existing
Architectures
Fixed trust model. Most permissioned blockchains rely on asyn-
chronous BFT replication protocols to establish consensus [57].
Such protocols typically rely on a security assumption that among
n > 3f peers, up to f are tolerated to misbehave and exhibit so-
called Byzantine faults [20]. The same peers often execute the appli-
cations as well, under the same security assumption (even though
one could actually restrict BFT execution to fewer peers [59]). How-
ever, such a quantitative trust assumption, irrespective of peers’
roles in the system, may not match the trust required for smart-
contract execution. In a flexible system, trust at the application
level should not be fixed to trust at the protocol level. A general-
purpose blockchain should decouple these two assumptions and
permit flexible trust models for applications.
Hard-coded consensus. Fabric is the first blockchain system that
introduced pluggable consensus. Before Fabric, virtually all block-
chain systems, permissioned or not, camewith a hard-coded consen-
sus protocol. However, decades of research on consensus protocols
have shown there is no such “one-size-fits-all” solution. For instance,
BFT protocols differ widely in their performance when deployed in
potentially adversarial environments [52]. A protocol with a “chain”
communication pattern exhibits provably optimal throughput on a
LAN cluster with symmetric and homogeneous links [34], but de-
grades badly on a wide-area, heterogeneous network. Furthermore,
external conditions such as load, network parameters, and actual
faults or attacks may vary over time in a given deployment. For
these reasons, BFT consensus should be inherently reconfigurable
and ideally adapt dynamically to a changing environment [17]. An-
other important aspect is to match the protocol’s trust assumption
to a given blockchain deployment scenario. Indeed, onemaywant to
replace BFT consensus with a protocol based on an alternative trust
model such as XFT [43], or a CFT protocol, such as Paxos/Raft [45]
and ZooKeeper [36], or even a permissionless protocol.
2.4 Experience with Order-Execute Blockchain
Prior to realizing the execute-order-validate architecture of Fab-
ric, we gained experience with building a permissioned blockchain
platform in the order-execute model, with PBFT [26] for consen-
sus. Namely, previous versions of Fabric (up to v0.6, released in
September 2016) have been architected following the ‘traditional‘
order-execute architecture.
From feedback obtained in many proof-of-concept applications,
the limitations of this approach became immediately clear. For
instance, users often observed diverging states at the peers and re-
ported a bug in the consensus protocol; in all cases, closer inspection
revealed that the culprit was non-deterministic transaction code.
Other complaints addressed limited performance, e.g., “only five
transactions per second,” until users confessed that their average
transaction took 200ms to execute. We have learned that the key
properties of a blockchain system, namely consistency, security,
and performance, must not depend on the knowledge and goodwill
of its users, in particular since the blockchain should run in an
untrusted environment.
3 ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we introduce the three-phase execute-order-validate
architecture and then explain the transaction flow.
3.1 Fabric Overview
Fabric is a distributed operating system for permissioned block-
chains that executes distributed applications written in general-
purpose programming languages (e.g., Go, Java, Node.js). It securely
tracks its execution history in an append-only replicated ledger
data structure and has no cryptocurrency built in.
Fabric introduces the execute-order-validate blockchain architec-
ture (illustrated in Fig. 2) and does not follow the standard order-
execute design, for reasons explained in Section 2. In a nutshell, a
distributed application for Fabric consists of two parts:
• A smart contract, called chaincode, which is program code
that implements the application logic and runs during the
execution phase. The chaincode is the central part of a dis-
tributed application in Fabric and may be written by an un-
trusted developer. Special chaincodes exist for managing the
blockchain system and maintaining parameters, collectively
called system chaincodes (Sec. 4.6).
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Figure 2: Execute-order-validate architecture of Fabric (rw-
set means a readset and writeset as explained in Sec. 3.2).
• An endorsement policy that is evaluated in the validation
phase. Endorsement policies cannot be chosen or modified
by untrusted application developers. An endorsement pol-
icy acts as a static library for transaction validation in Fab-
ric, which can merely be parameterized by the chaincode.
Only designated administrators may have a permission to
modify endorsement policies through system management
functions. A typical endorsement policy lets the chaincode
specify the endorsers for a transaction in the form of a set
of peers that are necessary for endorsement; it uses a mono-
tone logical expression on sets, such as “three out of five” or
“(A ∧ B) ∨C .” Custom endorsement policies may implement
arbitrary logic (e.g., our Bitcoin-inspired cryptocurrency in
Sec. 5.1).
A client sends transactions to the peers specified by the endorse-
ment policy. Each transaction is then executed by specific peers
and its output is recorded; this step is also called endorsement. After
execution, transactions enter the ordering phase, which uses a plug-
gable consensus protocol to produce a totally ordered sequence
of endorsed transactions grouped in blocks. These are broadcast
to all peers, with the (optional) help of gossip. Unlike standard ac-
tive replication [48], which totally orders transaction inputs, Fabric
orders transaction outputs combined with state dependencies, as
computed during the execution phase. Each peer then validates
the state changes from endorsed transactions with respect to the
endorsement policy and the consistency of the execution in the val-
idation phase. All peers validate the transactions in the same order
and validation is deterministic. In this sense, Fabric introduces a
novel hybrid replication paradigm in the Byzantine model, which
combines passive replication (the pre-consensus computation of
state updates) and active replication (the post-consensus validation
of execution results and state changes).
A Fabric blockchain consists of a set of nodes that form a network
(see Fig. 3). As Fabric is permissioned, all nodes that participate in
the network have an identity, as provided by a modularmembership
service provider (MSP) (Sec. 4.1). Nodes in a Fabric network take up
one of three roles:
• Clients submit transaction proposals for execution, help or-
chestrate the execution phase, and, finally, broadcast trans-
actions for ordering.
• Peers execute transaction proposals and validate transactions.
All peers maintain the blockchain ledger, an append-only
data structure recording all transactions in the form of a
hash chain, as well as the state, a succinct representation of
the latest ledger state. Not all peers execute all transaction
Appl.
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P P P P P P
SDK
OSN
P
OSNOSNOSNOSN
Client
Ordering
service
Peer-to-peer gossip
Peers (P)
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Appl.
Figure 3: A Fabric networkwith federatedMSPs and running
multiple (differently shaded and colored) chaincodes, selec-
tively installed on peers according to policy.
proposals, only a subset of them called endorsing peers (or,
simply, endorsers) does, as specified by the policy of the
chaincode to which the transaction pertains.
• Ordering Service Nodes (OSN) (or, simply, orderers) are the
nodes that collectively form the ordering service. In short, the
ordering service establishes the total order of all transactions
in Fabric, where each transaction contains state updates
and dependencies computed during the execution phase,
along with cryptographic signatures of the endorsing peers.
Orderers are entirely unaware of the application state, and
do not participate in the execution nor in the validation
of transactions. This design choice renders consensus in
Fabric as modular as possible and simplifies replacement of
consensus protocols in Fabric.
A Fabric network actually supports multiple blockchains con-
nected to the same ordering service. Each such blockchain is called
a channel and may have different peers as its members. Channels
can be used to partition the state of the blockchain network, but
consensus across channels is not coordinated and the total order of
transactions in each channel is separate from the others. Certain de-
ployments that consider all orderers as trusted may also implement
by-channel access control for peers. In the following we mention
channels only briefly and concentrate on one single channel.
In the next three sections we explain the transaction flow in
Fabric (depicted in Fig. 4) and illustrate the steps of the execution,
ordering, and validation phases. Then, we summarize the trust and
fault model of Fabric (Sec. 3.5).
3.2 Execution Phase
In the execution phase, clients sign and send the transaction proposal
(or, simply, proposal) to one or more endorsers for execution. Recall
that every chaincode implicitly specifies a set of endorsers via
the endorsement policy. A proposal contains the identity of the
submitting client (according to the MSP), the transaction payload in
the form of an operation to execute, parameters, and the identifier
of the chaincode, a nonce to be used only once by each client (such
as a counter or a random value), and a transaction identifier derived
from the client identifier and the nonce.
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Figure 4: Fabric high level transaction flow.
The endorsers simulate the proposal, by executing the operation
on the specified chaincode, which has been installed on the block-
chain. The chaincode runs in a Docker container, isolated from the
main endorser process.
A proposal is simulated against the endorser’s local blockchain
state, without synchronization with other peers. Moreover, en-
dorsers do not persist the results of the simulation to the ledger
state. The state of the blockchain is maintained by the peer trans-
action manager (PTM) in the form of a versioned key-value store,
in which successive updates to a key have monotonically increas-
ing version numbers (Sec. 4.4). The state created by a chaincode
is scoped exclusively to that chaincode and cannot be accessed
directly by another chaincode. Note that the chaincode is not sup-
posed to maintain the local state in the program code, only what
it maintains in the blockchain state that is accessed with GetState,
PutState, and DelState operations. Given the appropriate permis-
sion, a chaincode may invoke another chaincode to access its state
within the same channel.
As a result of the simulation, each endorser produces a value
writeset, consisting of the state updates produced by simulation
(i.e., the modified keys along with their new values), as well as
a readset, representing the version dependencies of the proposal
simulation (i.e., all keys read during simulation along with their
version numbers). After the simulation, the endorser cryptographi-
cally signs a message called endorsement, which contains readset
and writeset (together with metadata such as transaction ID, en-
dorser ID, and endorser signature) and sends it back to the client
in a proposal response. The client collects endorsements until they
satisfy the endorsement policy of the chaincode, which the transac-
tion invokes (see Sec. 3.4). In particular, this requires all endorsers
as determined by the policy to produce the same execution result
(i.e., identical readset and writeset). Then, the client proceeds to
create the transaction and passes it to the ordering service.
Discussion on design choices. As the endorsers simulate the pro-
posal without synchronizing with other endorsers, two endorsers
may execute it on different states of the ledger and produce differ-
ent outputs. For the standard endorsement policy which requires
multiple endorsers to produce the same result, this implies that
under high contention of operations accessing the same keys, a
client may not be able to satisfy the endorsement policy. This is a
new consideration compared to primary-backup replication in repli-
cated databases with synchronization through middleware [40]: a
consequence of the assumption that no single peer is trusted for
correct execution in a blockchain.
We consciously adopted this design, as it considerably simplifies
the architecture and is adequate for typical blockchain applica-
tions. As demonstrated by the approach of Bitcoin, distributed
applications can be formulated such that contention by operations
accessing the same state can be reduced, or eliminated completely
in the normal case (e.g., in Bitcoin, two operations that modify the
same “object” are not allowed and represent a double-spending
attack [44]). In the future, we plan to gradually enhance the live-
ness semantics of Fabric under contention, in particular to support
CRDTs [51] for complementing the current version dependency
checks, as well as a per-chaincode lead-endorser that would act as
a transaction sequencer.
Executing a transaction before the ordering phase is critical to
tolerating non-deterministic chaincodes (see also Sec. 2). A chain-
code in Fabric with non-deterministic transactions can only endan-
ger the liveness of its own operations, because a client might not
gather a sufficient number of endorsements, for instance. This is
a fundamental advantage over order-execute architecture, where
non-deterministic operations lead to inconsistencies in the state of
the peers.
Finally, tolerating non-deterministic execution also addresses
DoS attacks from untrusted chaincode as an endorser can simply
abort an execution according to a local policy if it suspects a DoS
attack. This will not endanger the consistency of the system, and
again, such unilateral abortion of execution is not possible in order-
execute architectures.
3.3 Ordering Phase
When a client has collected enough endorsements on a proposal,
it assembles a transaction and submits this to the ordering service.
The transaction contains the transaction payload (i.e., the chain-
code operation including parameters), transaction metadata, and a
set of endorsements. The ordering phase establishes a total order
on all submitted transactions per channel. In other words, ordering
atomically broadcasts [22] endorsements and thereby establishes
consensus on transactions, despite faulty orderers. Moreover, the or-
dering service batches multiple transactions into blocks and outputs
a hash-chained sequence of blocks containing transactions. Group-
ing or batching transactions into blocks improves the throughput
of the broadcast protocol, which is a well-known technique used in
fault-tolerant broadcasts.
At a high level, the interface of the ordering service only supports
the following two operations invoked by a peer and implicitly
parameterized by a channel identifier:
• broadcast(tx): A client calls this operation to broadcast an
arbitrary transaction tx , which usually contains the transac-
tion payload and a signature of the client, for dissemination.
• B ← deliver(s): A client calls this to retrieve block B with
non-negative sequence number s . The block contains a list
of transactions [tx1, . . . , txk ] and a hash-chain value h rep-
resenting the block with sequence number s − 1, i.e., B =
([tx1, . . . , txk ],h). As the client may call this multiple times
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and always returns the same block once it is available, we
say the peer delivers block B with sequence number s when
it receives B for the first time upon invoking deliver(s).
The ordering service ensures that the delivered blocks on one
channel are totally ordered. More specifically, ordering ensures the
following safety properties for each channel:
Agreement: For any two blocks B delivered with sequence num-
ber s and B′ delivered with s ′ at correct peers such that s = s ′,
it holds B = B′.
Hash chain integrity: If some correct peer delivers a block B
with number s and another correct peer delivers block B′ =
([tx1, . . . , txk ],h′)with number s+1, then it holdsh′ = H (B),
where H (·) denotes the cryptographic hash function.
No skipping: If a correct peerp delivers a blockwith number s > 0
then for each i = 0, . . . , s − 1, peer p has already delivered a
block with number i .
No creation: When a correct peer delivers block B with number s ,
then for every tx ∈ B some client has already broadcast tx .
For liveness, the ordering service supports at least the following
“eventual” property:
Validity: If a correct client invokes broadcast(tx), then every cor-
rect peer eventually delivers a block B that includes tx , with
some sequence number.
However, every individual ordering implementation is allowed to
come with its own liveness and fairness guarantees with respect to
client requests.
Since there may be a large number of peers in the blockchain
network, but only relatively few nodes are expected to implement
the ordering service, Fabric can be configured to use a built-in gossip
service for disseminating delivered blocks from the ordering service
to all peers (Sec. 4.3). The implementation of gossip is scalable and
agnostic to the particular implementation of the ordering service,
hence it works with both CFT and BFT ordering services, ensuring
the modularity of Fabric.
The ordering service may also perform access control checks to
see if a client is allowed to broadcast messages or receive blocks on
a given channel. This and other features of the ordering service are
further explained in Section 4.2.
Discussion on design choices. It is very important that the or-
dering service does not maintain any state of the blockchain, and
neither validates nor executes transactions. This architecture is
a crucial, defining feature of Fabric, and makes Fabric the first
blockchain system to totally separate consensus from execution
and validation. This makes consensus as modular as possible, and
enables an ecosystem of consensus protocols implementing the or-
dering service. The hash chain integrity property and the chaining
of blocks exist only to make the integrity verification of the block
sequence by the peers more efficient. Finally, note that we do not
require the ordering service to prevent transaction duplication. This
simplifies its implementation and is not a concern since duplicated
transactions are filtered in the read-write check by the peers during
validation.
3.4 Validation Phase
Blocks are delivered to peers either directly by the ordering service
or through gossip. A new block then enters the validation phase
which consists of three sequential steps:
(1) The endorsement policy evaluation occurs in parallel for all
transactions within the block. The evaluation is the task of
the so-called validation system chaincode (VSCC), a static
library that is part of the blockchain’s configuration and is
responsible for validating the endorsement with respect to
the endorsement policy configured for the chaincode (see
Sec. 4.6). If the endorsement is not satisfied, the transaction
is marked as invalid and its effects are disregarded.
(2) A read-write conflict check is done for all transactions in the
block sequentially. For each transaction it compares the ver-
sions of the keys in the readset field to those in the current
state of the ledger, as stored locally by the peer, and ensures
they are still the same. If the versions do not match, the trans-
action is marked as invalid and its effects are disregarded.
(3) The ledger update phase runs last, in which the block is
appended to the locally stored ledger and the blockchain
state is updated. In particular, when adding the block to the
ledger, the results of the validity checks in the first two steps
are persisted as well, in the form of a bit mask denoting the
transactions that are valid within the block. This facilitates
the reconstruction of the state at a later time. Furthermore,
all state updates are applied by writing all key-value pairs
in writeset to the local state.
The default VSCC in Fabric allows monotone logical expressions
over the set of endorsers configured for a chaincode to be expressed.
The VSCC evaluation verifies that the set of peers, as expressed
through valid signatures on endorsements of the transaction, satisfy
the expression. Different VSCC policies can be configured statically,
however.
Discussion on design choices. The ledger of Fabric contains all
transactions, including those that are deemed invalid. This follows
from the overall design, because ordering service, which is agnostic
to chaincode state, produces the chain of the blocks and because
the validation is done by the peers post-consensus. This feature is
needed in certain use cases that require tracking of invalid trans-
actions during subsequent audits, and stands in contrast to other
blockchains (e.g., Bitcoin and Ethereum), where the ledger contains
only valid transactions. In addition, due to the permissioned nature
of Fabric, detecting clients that try to mount a DoS attack by flood-
ing the network with invalid transactions is easy. One approach
would be to black-list such clients according to a policy that could
be put in place. Furthermore, a specific deployment could imple-
ment transaction fees (using our currency implementation from
Sec. 5.1 or another approach) to charge for transaction invocation,
which would render a DoS attack prohibitively expensive.
3.5 Trust and Fault Model
Fabric can accommodate flexible trust and fault assumptions. In
general, any client is considered potentially malicious or Byzantine.
Peers are grouped into organizations and every organization forms
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one trust domain, such that a peer trusts all peers within its organi-
zation but no peer of another organization. The ordering service
considers all peers (and clients) as potentially Byzantine.
The integrity of a Fabric network relies on the consistency of the
ordering service. The trust model of the ordering service depends
directly on its implementation (see Sec. 3.3). As of release v1.0.6,
Fabric supports a centralized, single-node implementation, used
in development and testing, and a CFT ordering service running
on a cluster. A third implementation, a proof of concept based on
BFT-SMaRt [19], tolerates up to one third of Byzantine OSNs [53].
Note that Fabric decouples the trust model for applications from
the trust model of consensus. Namely, a distributed application can
define its own trust assumptions, which are conveyed through the
endorsement policy, and are independent from those of consensus
implemented by the ordering service (see also Sec. 3.4).
4 FABRIC COMPONENTS
Fabric is written in Go and uses the gRPC framework [6] for com-
munication between clients, peers, and orderers. In the following
we describe some important components in more detail. Figure 5
shows the components of a peer.
Committer
Peer
Endorser
Ledger
Gossip
KVS
Validation, configuration, sys. chaincode
Block store, peer trans. manager (PTM)
LevelDB, CouchDB
Peer-to-peer block gossip
Chaincode execution, containers
Figure 5: Components of a Fabric peer.
4.1 Membership Service
The membership service provider (MSP) maintains the identities of
all nodes in the system (clients, peers, and OSNs) and is responsible
for issuing node credentials that are used for authentication and
authorization. Since Fabric is permissioned, all interactions among
nodes occur throughmessages that are authenticated, typically with
digital signatures. The membership service comprises a component
at each node, where it may authenticate transactions, verify the
integrity of transactions, sign and validate endorsements, and au-
thenticate other blockchain operations. Tools for key management
and registration of nodes are also part of the MSP.
The MSP is an abstraction for which different instantiations
are possible. The default MSP implementation in Fabric handles
standard PKI methods for authentication based on digital signatures
and can accommodate commercial certification authorities (CAs).
A stand-alone CA is provided as well with Fabric, called Fabric-CA.
Furthermore, alternative MSP implementations are envisaged, such
as one relying on anonymous credentials for authorizing a client
to invoke a transaction without linking this to an identity [25].
Fabric allows two modes for setting up a blockchain network.
In offline mode, credentials are generated by a CA and distributed
out-of-band to all nodes. Peers and orderers can only be registered
in offline mode. For enrolling clients, Fabric-CA provides an online
mode that issues cryptographic credentials to them. The MSP con-
figuration must ensure that all nodes, especially all peers, recognize
the same identities and authentications as valid.
The MSP permits identity federation, for example, when multiple
organizations operate a blockchain network. Each organization
issues identities to its own members and every peer recognizes
members of all organizations. This can be achieved with multiple
MSP instantiations, for example, by creating a mapping between
each organization and an MSP.
4.2 Ordering Service
The ordering service manages multiple channels. On every channel,
it provides the following services:
(1) Atomic broadcast for establishing order on transactions, im-
plementing the broadcast and deliver calls (Sec. 3.3).
(2) Reconfiguration of a channel, when its members modify the
channel by broadcasting a configuration update transaction
(Sec. 4.6).
(3) Optionally, access control, in those configurations where the
ordering service acts as a trusted entity, restricting broad-
casting of transactions and receiving of blocks to specified
clients and peers.
The ordering service is bootstrapped with a genesis block on the
system channel. This block carries a configuration transaction that
defines the ordering service poroperties.
The current production implementation consists of ordering-ser-
vice nodes (OSNs) that implement the operations described here
and communicate through the system channel. The actual atomic
broadcast function is provided by an instance of Apache Kafka
[2] which offers scalable publish-subscribe messaging and strong
consistency despite node crashes, based on ZooKeeper. Kafka may
run on physical nodes separate from the OSNs. The OSNs act as
proxies between the peers and Kafka.
An OSN directly injects a newly received transaction to the
atomic broadcast (e.g., to the Kafka broker). OSNs batch transactions
received from the atomic broadcast and form blocks. A block is cut
as soon as one of three conditions is met: (1) the block contains
the specified maximal number of transactions; (2) the block has
reached a maximal size (in bytes); or (3) an amount of time has
elapsed since the first transaction of a new block was received, as
explained below.
This batching process is deterministic and therefore produces
the same blocks at all nodes. It is easy to see that the first two con-
ditions are trivially deterministic, given the stream of transactions
received from the atomic broadcast. To ensure deterministic block
production in the third case, a node starts a timer when it reads
the first transaction in a block from the atomic broadcast. If the
block is not yet cut when the timer expires, the OSN broadcasts a
special time-to-cut transaction on the channel, which indicates the
sequence number of the block which it intends to cut. On the other
hand, every OSN immediately cuts a new block upon receiving the
first time-to-cut transaction for the given block number. Since this
transaction is atomically delivered to all connected OSNs, they all
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include the same list of transactions in the block. The OSNs per-
sist a range of the most recently delivered blocks directly to their
filesystem, so they can answer to peers retrieving blocks through
deliver.
The ordering service based on Kafka is one of three implementa-
tions currently available. A centralized orderer, called Solo, runs on
one node and is used for development. A proof-of-concept ordering
service based on BFT-SMaRt [19] has also been made available [53];
it ensures the atomic broadcast service, but not yet reconfiguration
and access control. This illustrates the modularity of consensus in
Fabric.
4.3 Peer Gossip
One advantage of separating the execution, ordering, and valida-
tion phases is that they can be scaled independently. However,
since most consensus algorithms (in the CFT and BFT models) are
bandwidth-bound, the throughput of the ordering service is capped
by the network capacity of its nodes. Consensus cannot be scaled
up by adding more nodes [28, 57], rather, throughput will decrease.
However, since ordering and validation are decoupled, we are inter-
ested in efficiently broadcasting the execution results to all peers for
validation, after the ordering phase. This, along with state transfer
to newly joining peers and peers that were disconnected for a long
time, is precisely the goal of the gossip component. Fabric gossip
utilizes epidemic multicast [29] for this purpose. The blocks are
signed by the ordering service. This means that a peer can, upon
receiving all blocks, independently assemble the blockchain and
verify its integrity.
The communication layer for gossip is based on gRPC and utilizes
TLS with mutual authentication, which enables each side to bind
the TLS credentials to the identity of the remote peer. The gossip
component maintains an up-to-date membership view of the online
peers in the system. All peers independently build a local view from
periodically disseminated membership data. Furthermore, a peer
can reconnect to the view after a crash or a network outage.
Fabric gossip uses two phases for information dissemination:
during push, each peer selects a random set of active neighbors
from the membership view, and forwards them the message; during
pull, each peer periodically probes a set of randomly selected peers
and requestsmissingmessages. It has been shown [29, 38] that using
both methods in tandem is crucial to optimally utilize the available
bandwidth and to ensure that all peers receive all messages with
high probability. In order to reduce the load of sending blocks from
the ordering nodes to the network, the protocol also elects a leader
peer that pulls blocks from the ordering service on their behalf
and initiates the gossip distribution. This mechanism is resilient to
leader failures.
4.4 Ledger
The ledger component at each peer maintains the ledger and the
state on persistent storage and enables simulation, validation, and
ledger-update phases. Broadly, it consists of a block store and a peer
transaction manager.
The ledger block store persists transaction blocks and is imple-
mented as a set of append-only files. Since the blocks are immutable
and arrive in a definite order, an append-only structure gives max-
imum performance. In addition, the block store maintains a few
indices for random access to a block or to a transaction in a block.
The peer transaction manager (PTM) maintains the latest state
in a versioned key-value store. It stores one tuple of the form
(key, val, ver) for each unique entry key stored by any chaincode,
containing its most recently stored value val and its latest version
ver. The version consists of the block sequence number and the se-
quence number of the transaction (that stores the entry) within the
block. This makes the version unique and monotonically increasing.
The PTM uses a local key-value store to realize its versioned vari-
ant, with implementations using LevelDB (in Go) [10] and Apache
CouchDB [1].
During simulation the PTM provides a stable snapshot of the
latest state to the transaction. As mentioned in Section 3.2, the
PTM records in readset a tuple (key, ver) for each entry accessed by
GetState and in writeset a tuple (key, val) for each entry updated
with PutState by the transaction. In addition, the PTM supports
range queries, for which it computes a cryptographic hash of the
query results (a set of tuples (key, ver)) and adds the query string
itself and the hash to readset.
For transaction validation (Sec. 3.4), the PTM validates all trans-
actions in a block sequentially. This checks whether a transaction
conflicts with any preceding transaction (within the block or ear-
lier). For any key in readset, if the version recorded in readset differs
from the version present in the latest state (assuming that all pre-
ceding valid transactions are committed), then the PTM marks
the transaction as invalid. For range queries, the PTM re-executes
the query and compares the hash with the one present in readset,
to ensure that no phantom reads occur. This read-write conflict
semantics results in one-copy serializability [39].
The ledger component tolerates a crash of the peer during the
ledger update as follows. After receiving a new block, the PTM
has already performed validation and marked transactions as valid
or invalid within the block, using a bit mask as mentioned in Sec-
tion 3.4. The ledger now writes the block to the ledger block store,
flushes it to disk, and subsequently updates the block store indices.
Then the PTM applies the state changes from writeset of all valid
transactions to the local versioned store. Finally, it computes and
persists a value savepoint, which denotes the largest successfully
applied block number. The value savepoint is used to recover the in-
dices and the latest state from the persisted blocks when recovering
from a crash.
4.5 Chaincode Execution
Chaincode is executed within an environment loosely coupled to
the rest of the peer, which supports plugins for adding new chain-
code programming languages. Currently Go, Java, and Node are
supported.
Every user-level or application chaincode runs in a separate pro-
cess within a Docker container environment, which isolates the
chaincodes from each other and from the peer. This also simpli-
fies the management of the lifecycle for chaincodes (i.e., starting,
stopping, or aborting chaincode). The chaincode and the peer com-
municate using gRPC messages. Through this loose coupling, the
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peer is agnostic of the actual language in which chaincode is im-
plemented.
In contrast to application chaincode, system chaincode runs di-
rectly in the peer process. System chaincode can implement specific
functions needed by Fabric and may be used in situations where the
isolation among user chaincodes is overly restrictive. More details
on system chaincodes are given in the next section.
4.6 Configuration and System Chaincodes
Fabric is customized through channel configuration and through
special chaincodes, known as system chaincodes.
Recall each channel in Fabric forms one logical blockchain. The
configuration of a channel is maintained in metadata persisted in
special configuration blocks. Each configuration block contains the
full channel configuration and does not contain any other transac-
tions. Each blockchain begins with a configuration block known
as the genesis block which is used to bootstrap the channel. The
channel configuration includes: (1) definitions of the MSPs for the
participating nodes, (2) the network addresses of the OSNs, (3)
shared configuration for the consensus implementation and the or-
dering service, such as batch size and timeouts, (4) rules governing
access to the ordering service operations (broadcast, and deliver),
and (5) rules governing how each part the channel configuration
may be modified.
The configuration of a channel may be updated using a channel
configuration update transaction. This transaction contains a repre-
sentation of the changes to be made to the configuration, as well as
a set of signatures. The ordering service nodes evaluate whether
the update is valid by using the current configuration to verify that
the modifications are authorized using the signatures. The order-
ers then generate a new configuration block, which embeds the
new configuration and the configuration update transaction. Peers
receiving this block validate whether the configuration update is
authorized based on the current configuration; if valid, they update
their current configuration.
The application chaincodes are deployed with a reference to an
endorsement system chaincode (ESCC) and to a validation system
chaincode (VSCC). These two chaincodes are selected such that the
output of the ESCC (an endorsement) may be validated as part
of the input to the VSCC. The ESCC takes as input a proposal
and the proposal simulation results. If the results are satisfactory,
then the ESCC produces a response, containing the results and the
endorsement. For the default ESCC, this endorsement is simply a
signature by the peer’s local signing identity. The VSCC takes as
input a transaction and outputs whether that transaction is valid.
For the default VSCC, the endorsements are collected and evaluated
against the endorsement policy specified for the chaincode. Further
system chaincodes implement other support functions, such as
chaincode lifecycle.
5 EVALUATION
Even though Fabric is not yet performance-tuned and optimized, we
report in this section on some preliminary performance numbers.
Fabric is a complex distributed system; its performance depends on
many parameters including the choice of a distributed application
and transaction size, the ordering service and consensus implemen-
tation and their parameters, the network parameters and topology
of nodes in the network, the hardware onwhich nodes run, the num-
ber of nodes and channels, further configuration parameters, and
the network dynamics. Therefore, in-depth performance evaluation
of Fabric is postponed to future work.
In the absence of a standard benchmark for blockchains, we use
the most prominent blockchain application for evaluating Fabric, a
simple authority-minted cryptocurrency that uses the data model of
Bitcoin, which we call Fabric coin (abbreviated hereafter as Fabcoin).
This allows us to put the performance of Fabric in the context
of other permissioned blockchains, which are often derived from
Bitcoin or Ethereum. For example, it is also the application used in
benchmarks of other permissioned blockchains [35, 50].
In the following, we first describe Fabcoin (Sec. 5.1), which also
demonstrates how to customize the validation phase and endorse-
ment policy. In Section 5.2 we present the benchmark and discuss
our results.
5.1 Fabric Coin (Fabcoin)
UTXO cryptocurrencies. The datamodel introduced by Bitcoin [44]
has become known as “unspent transaction output” or UTXO, and
is also used by many other cryptocurrencies and distributed appli-
cations. UTXO represents each step in the evolution of a data object
as a separate atomic state on the ledger. Such a state is created by a
transaction and destroyed (or “consumed”) by another unique trans-
action occurring later. Every given transaction destroys a number
of input states and creates one or more output states. A “coin” in
Bitcoin is initially created by a coinbase transaction that rewards
the “miner” of the block. This appears on the ledger as a coin state
designating the miner as the owner. Any coin can be spent in the
sense that the coin is assigned to a new owner by a transaction that
atomically destroys the current coin state designating the previous
owner and creates another coin state representing the new owner.
We capture the UTXO model in the key-value store of Fabric as
follows. Each UTXO state corresponds to a unique KVS entry that
is created once (the coin state is “unspent”) and destroyed once (the
coin state is “spent”). Equivalently, every state may be seen as a
KVS entry with logical version 0 after creation; when it is destroyed
again, it receives version 1. There should not be any concurrent
updates to such entries (e.g., attempting to update a coin state in
different ways amounts to double-spending the coin).
Value in the UTXO model is transferred through transactions
that refer to several input states that all belong to the entity issuing
the transaction. An entity owns a state because the public key of
the entity is contained in the state itself. Every transaction creates
one or more output states in the KVS representing the new owners,
deletes the input states in the KVS, and ensures that the sum of
the values in the input states equals the sum of the output states’
values. There is also a policy determining how value is created (e.g.,
coinbase transactions in Bitcoin or specificmint operations in other
systems) or destroyed.
Fabcoin implementation. Each state in Fabcoin is a tuple of the
form (key, val) = (txid.j, (amount, owner, label)), denoting the coin
state created as the j-th output of a transaction with identifier txid
and allocating amount units labeled with label to the entity whose
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public key is owner. Labels are strings used to identify a given
type of a coin (e.g., ‘USD‘, ‘EUR‘, ‘FBC‘). Transaction identifiers are
short values that uniquely identify every Fabric transaction. The
Fabcoin implementation consists of three parts: (1) a client wallet,
(2) the Fabcoin chaincode, and (3) a custom VSCC for Fabcoin
implementing its endorsement policy.
Client wallet. By default, each Fabric client maintains a Fab-
coin wallet that locally stores a set of cryptographic keys allowing
the client to spend coins. For creating a spend transaction that
transfers one or more coins, the client wallet creates a Fabcoin
request request = (inputs, outputs, sigs) containing: (1) a list of in-
put coin states, inputs = [in, . . . ] that specify coin states (in, . . . )
the client wishes to spend, as well as (2) a list of output coin states,
outputs = [(amount, owner, label), . . . ]. The client wallet signs, with
the private keys that correspond to the input coin states, the con-
catenation of the Fabcoin request and a nonce, which is a part of
every Fabric transaction, and adds the signatures in a set sigs. A
spend transaction is valid when the sum of the amounts in the
input coin states is at least the sum of the amounts in the outputs
and when the output amounts are positive. For a mint transaction
that creates new coins, inputs contains only an identifier (i.e., a
reference to a public key) of a special entity called Central Bank
(CB), whereas outputs contains an arbitrary number of coin states.
To be considered valid, the signatures of a mint transaction in sigs
must be a cryptographic signature under the public key of CB over
the concatenation of the Fabcoin request and the aforementioned
nonce. Fabcoin may be configured to use multiple CBs or specify a
threshold number of signatures from a set of CBs. Finally, the client
wallet includes the Fabcoin request into a transaction and sends
this to a peer of its choice.
Fabcoin chaincode. A peer runs the chaincode of Fabcoin which
simulates the transaction and creates readsets and writesets. In a
nutshell, in the case of a spend transaction, for every input coin
state in ∈ inputs the chaincode first performs GetState(in); this in-
cludes in in the readset alongwith its current version (Sec. 4.4). Then
the chaincode executes DelState(in) for every input state in, which
also adds in to the writeset and effectively marks the coin state
as “spent.” Finally, for j = 1, . . . , |outputs|, the chaincode executes
PutState(txid.j, out)with the j-th output out = (amount, owner, label)
in outputs. In addition, a peer may run the transaction validation
code as described next in the VSCC step for Fabcoin; this is not
necessary, since the Fabcoin VSCC actually validates transactions,
but it allows the (correct) peers to filter out potentially malformed
transactions. In our implementation, the chaincode runs the Fabcoin
VSCC without cryptographically verifying the signatures (these
are verified only in the actual VSCC).
Custom VSCC. Finally, every peer validates Fabcoin transactions
using a custom VSCC. This verifies the cryptographic signature(s)
in sigs under the respective public key(s) and performs semantic
validation as follows. For a mint transaction, it checks that the
output states are created under the matching transaction identi-
fier (txid) and that all output amounts are positive. For a spend
transaction, the VSCC additionally verifies (1) that for all input coin
states, an entry in the readset has been created and that it was also
added to the writeset and marked as deleted, (2) that the sum of the
amounts for all input coin states equals the sum of amounts of all
output coin states, and (3) that input and output coin labels match.
Here, the VSCC obtains the input coin amounts by retrieving their
current values from the ledger.
Note that the Fabcoin VSCC does not check transactions for
double spending, as this occurs through Fabric’s standard validation
that runs after the custom VSCC. In particular, if two transactions
attempt to assign the same unspent coin state to a new owner, both
would pass the VSCC logic but would be caught subsequently in
the read-write conflict check performed by the PTM. According
to Sections 3.4 and 4.4, the PTM verifies that the current version
number stored in the ledger matches the one in the readset; hence,
after the first transaction has changed the version of the coin state,
the transaction ordered second will be recognized as invalid.
5.2 Experiments
Setup. Unless explicitly mentioned differently, in our experi-
ments: (1) nodes run on Fabric version v1.1.0-preview2 instru-
mented for performance evaluation through local logging, (2) nodes
are hosted in a single IBM Cloud (SoftLayer) data center (DC) as
dedicated VMs interconnected with 1Gbps (nominal) networking,
(3) all nodes are 2.0 GHz 16-vCPU VMs running Ubuntu with 8GB
of RAM and SSDs as local disks, (4) a single-channel ordering ser-
vice runs a typical Kafka orderer setup with 3 ZooKeeper nodes, 4
Kafka brokers and 3 Fabric orderers, all on distinct VMs, (5) there
are 5 peers in total, all belonging to different organizations (orgs)
and all being Fabcoin endorsers, and (6) signatures use the default
256-bit ECDSA scheme. In order to measure and stage latencies in
the transaction flow spanning multiple nodes, the node clocks are
synchronized with an NTP service throughout the experiments. All
communication among Fabric nodes is configured to use TLS.
Methodology. In every experiment, in the first phase we invoke
transactions that contain only Fabcoin mint operations to produce
the coins, and then run a second phase of the experiment in which
we invoke Fabcoin spend operation on previously minted coins
(effectively running single-input, single-output spend transactions).
When reporting throughput measurements, we use an increasing
number of Fabric CLI clients (modified to issue concurrent requests)
running on a single VM, until the end-to-end throughput is satu-
rated, and state the throughput just below saturation. Throughput
numbers are reported as the average measured during the steady
state of an experiment, disregarding the “tail,” where some client
threads already stop submitting their share of transactions. In every
experiment, the client threads collectively invoke at least 500k mint
and spend transactions.
Experiment 1: Choosing the block size. A critical Fabric configura-
tion parameter that impacts both throughput and latency is block
size. To fix the block size for subsequent experiments, and to evalu-
ate the impact of block size on performance, we ran experiments
varying block size from 0.5MB to 4MB. Results are depicted in Fig. 6,
showing peak throughput measured at the peers along with the
corresponding average end-to-end (e2e) latency.
We can observe that throughput does not significantly improve
beyond a block size of 2MB, but latency gets worse (as expected).
2Patched with commit IDs 9e770062 and eb437dab in the Fabric master branch.
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Figure 6: Impact of block size on throughput and latency.
Therefore, we adopt 2MB as the block size for the following ex-
periments, with the goal of maximizing the measured throughput,
assuming the end-to-end latency of roughly 500ms is acceptable.
Size of transactions. During this experiment, we also observed
the size mint and spend transactions. In particular, the 2MB-blocks
contained 473 mint or 670 spend transactions, i.e., the average
transaction size is 3.06kB for spend and 4.33kB for mint. In gen-
eral, transactions in Fabric are large because they carry certificate
information. Besides, mint transactions of Fabcoin are larger than
spend transactions because they carry CB certificates. This is an
avenue for future improvement of both Fabric and Fabcoin.
Experiment 2: Impact of peer CPU. Fabric peers run many CPU-
intensive cryptographic operations. To estimate the impact of CPU
power on throughput, we performed a set of experiments in which
4 peers run on 4, 8, 16, and 32 vCPU VMs, while also doing coarse-
grained latency staging of block validation to identify bottlenecks.
Our experiment focused on the validation phase, as ordering
with the Kafka ordering service has never been a bottleneck in our
cluster experiments (within one data center). The validation phase,
and in particular the VSCC validation of Fabcoin, is computation-
ally intensive, due to its many digital signature verifications. We
calculate the validation throughput at the peer based on measuring
validation phase latency locally at the peer.
The results, with 2MB blocks, are shown in Fig. 7, for blocks
containing mint (Fig. 7a) and spend (Fig. 7b) operations. For both
operations the measured throughput and latency scale in the same
way with the number of vCPUs. We can observe that the validation
effort clearly limits the achievable (end-to-end) throughput. Fur-
thermore, the validation performance by the Fabcoin VSCC scales
quasi-linearly with CPU, as the endorsement policy verification
by Fabric’s VSCC is embarrassingly parallel. However, the read-
write-check and ledger-access stages are sequential and become
dominant with a larger number of cores (vCPUs). This is in par-
ticular noticeable for spend transactions, since more spend than
mint transactions can fit into a 2MB block, which prolongs the
duration of the sequential validation stages (i.e., read-write-check
and ledger-access).
This experiment suggests that future versions of Fabric could
profit from pipelining the validation stages (which are now se-
quential), removing sequential overhead in the peer that causes a
(a) Blocks containing only mint transactions.
(b) Blocks containing only spend transactions.
Figure 7: Impact of peer CPU on end-to-end throughput, val-
idation throughput and block validation latency.
noticeable difference between validation and end-to-end through-
put, optimizing stable-storage access, and parallelizing read-write
dependency checks.
Finally, in this experiment, we measured over 3560 transactions
per second (tps) average spend (end-to-end) throughput at the 32-
vCPU peer. The mint throughput is, in general, slightly lower than
that of spend, but the difference is within 10%, with 32-vCPU peer
reaching over 3420 tps average mint throughput.
Latency profiling by stages. We further performed coarse-grained
profiling of latency during our previous experiment at the peak
reported throughput. Results are depicted in Table 1. The ordering
phase comprises broadcast-deliver latency and internal latency
within a peer before validation starts. The table reports average
latencies for mint and spend, standard deviation, and tail latencies.
We observe that ordering dominates the overall latency. We
also see that average latencies lie below 550ms with sub-second
tail latencies. In particular, the highest end-to-end latencies in our
experiment come from the first blocks, during the load build-up.
Latency under lower load can be regulated and reduced using the
time-to-cut parameter of the orderer (see Sec. 3.3), which we basi-
cally do not use in our experiments, as we set it to a large value.
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avg st.dev 99% 99.9%
(1) endorsement 5.6 / 7.5 2.4 / 4.2 15 / 21 19 / 26
(2) ordering 248 / 365 60.0 / 92.0 484 / 624 523 / 636
(3) VSCC val. 31.0 / 35.3 10.2 / 9.0 72.7 / 57.0 113 / 108.4
(4) R/W check 34.8 / 61.5 3.9 / 9.3 47.0 / 88.5 59.0 / 93.3
(5) ledger 50.6 / 72.2 6.2 / 8.8 70.1 / 97.5 72.5 / 105
(6) validation (3+4+5) 116 / 169 12.8 / 17.8 156 / 216 199 / 230
(7) end-to-end (1+2+6) 371 / 542 63 / 94 612 / 805 646 / 813
Table 1: Latency statistics in milliseconds (ms) for mint and
spend, broken down into five stages at a 32-vCPU peer with
2MB blocks. Validation (6) comprises stages 3, 4, and 5; the
end-to-end latency contains stages 1–5.
Experiment 3: SSD vs. RAM disk. To evaluate the potential gains
related to stable storage, we repeated the previous experiment with
RAM disks (tmpfs) mounted as stable storage at all peer VMs. The
benefits are limited, as tmpfs only helps with the ledger phase of
the validation at the peer. We measured sustained peak throughput
at 3870 SPEND tps at 32-vCPU peer, roughly a 9% improvement
over SSD.
Experiment 4: Scalability on LAN. In this and the following ex-
periment we increase the number of peers (with 16 vCPUs each) to
evaluate the scalability of Fabric.
In this experiment we maintain one peer per organization hosted
in a single IBM Cloud DC (Hong Kong, HK). All peers receive blocks
directly from the ordering service without gossip. We start from 20
peers (10 of which are Fabcoin endorsers) and increase the number
of peers to 100. The achievable peak throughput in function of the
number of peers is depicted in Fig. 8 (“LAN” suffix).
Figure 8: Impact of varying number of peers on non-
endorsing peer throughput.
We observe that the Kafka ordering service handles the added
number of peers well and scales with the increase. As peers connect
randomly to OSNs, the bandwidth of 3 OSNs should become a
bottleneck with the 1Gbps nominal throughput of the network.
However, this does not occur. We tracked down the reason for
this and found that the provisioned bandwidth in the IBM Cloud
was higher than nominal one, with netperf reporting consistently
5-6.5Gbps between pairs of nodes.
Experiment 5: Scalability over two DCs and impact of gossip. In a
follow-up experiment, we moved the ordering service, 10 endorsers,
and the clients to the nearby Tokyo (TK) data center, leaving the
non-endorsing peers in the HK DC. The goal in this (and the next)
experiment is to evaluate the system when the network bandwidth
becomes the bottleneck. We varied the number of non-endorsing
peers in HK from 20 to 80, maintaining direct connectivity with the
ordering service (i.e., one peer per org), in addition to 10 endorsing
peers in TK. The single-TCP netperf throughput reported between
two VMs in TK and HK is 240 Mbps on average.
The peak throughput in function of the (total) number of peers is
depicted in Fig. 8 (“2DC” suffix). We clearly see that the throughput
is basically the same as in the previous experiment with 30 peers,
but it drops when the number of peers increases. The throughput
is reduced since the network connections of 3 OSNs in TK are satu-
rated. We measured 1910 tps mint and 2190 tps spend throughput
(at HK peers) with a total of 90 peers in this configuration.
To cope with this, and to improve the scalability over a WAN,
Fabric may employ gossip (Sec. 4.3). We repeated the last measure-
ment with 80 peers in HK (totaling 90 peers) but reconfigured these
peers into 8 orgs of 10 peers each. In this configuration, only one
leader peer per org connects directly to the ordering service and
gossips the blocks to the others in its org. This experiment (with a
gossip fanout of 7) achieves 2544/2753 tpsmint/spend average peak
throughput at HK peers, which means that gossip nicely serves its
intended function. The throughput is somewhat lower than in the
LAN experiment, as org leader peers (directly connected to OSNs
in both experiments) now need to manage gossip as well.
Experiment 6: Performance over multiple data centers (WAN). Fi-
nally, we extend the last experiment to 5 different data centers:
Tokyo (TK), Hong Kong (HK), Melbourne (ML), Sydney (SD), and
Oslo (OS), with 20 peers in each data center, totaling 100 peers. As
in the previous experiment, the ordering service, 10 endorsers, and
all clients are in TK. We run this experiment without gossip (one
peer per org) and with gossip (10 orgs of 10 peers, 2 orgs per data
center, fanout 7). The results are summarized in Table 2, averaged
across peers belonging to same data center. For reference, the first
row of the table shows the netperf throughput between a VM in a
given data center and TK.
HK ML SD OS
netperf to TK [Mbps] 240 98 108 54
peak mint / spend
throughput [tps]
(without gossip)
1914 / 2048 1914 / 2048 1914 / 2048 1389 / 1838
peak mint / spend
throughput [tps]
(with gossip)
2553 / 2762 2558 / 2763 2271 / 2409 1484 / 2013
Table 2: Experiment with 100 peers across 5 data centers.
The results again clearly show the benefits of using gossip when
the peers are scattered over a WAN. We observe interesting results
with the peers in OS and SD compared to HK and ML. The lower
throughput with gossip for SD is due to CPU limitations of VMs
in SD; with the same specification, they achieve lower validation
throughput than peers in HK and ML. In OS the total throughput is
much lower. The bottleneck, however, is not the bandwidth of the
ordering service but the single-TCP connection bandwidth from
OS to TK, as our netperf measurement suggests. Hence, the true
benefits of gossip in OS cannot be observed; we attribute the slight
improvement in throughput in OS in the experiment with gossip
to fewer TCP connections running from OS to TK.
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6 APPLICATIONS AND USE CASES
Major cloud operators already offer (or have announced) “blockchain-
as-a-service” running Fabric, including Oracle, IBM, and Microsoft.
Moreover, Fabric currently powers more than 400 prototypes and
proofs-of-concepts of distributed ledger technology and several
production systems, across different industries and use cases [47].
Examples include a food-safety network [16], cloud-service block-
chain platforms for banking [31], and a digital global shipping
trade [33] solution. In this section, we illustrate some real use cases
where Fabric has been deployed.
Foreign exchange (FX) netting. A system for bilateral payment
netting of foreign exchange runs on Fabric. It uses a Fabric channel
for each pair of involved client institutions for privacy. A special
institution (the “settler”) responsible for netting and settlement is a
member of all channels and runs the ordering service. The block-
chain helps to resolve trades that are not settling and maintains all
the necessary information in the ledger. This data can be accessed
in real time by clients and helps with liquidity, resolving disputes,
reducing exposures, and minimizing credit risk [49].
Enterprise asset management (EAM). This solution tracks hard-
ware assets as they move from manufacturing to deployment and
eventually to disposal, capturing additionally licenses of software
assets associated with the hardware. The blockchain records the
various life-cycle events of assets and the associated evidence. The
ledger serves as a transparent system of record between all partic-
ipants who are involved with the asset, which improves the data
quality that traditional solutions struggle with. The multi-party
consortium blockchain runs among the manufacturer, shippers,
receivers, customers, and the installers. It uses a 3-tiered architec-
ture, with a user interface connecting through the Fabric client to
the peers. A detailed description of the first version is available
online [56].
Global cross-currency payments. In collaboration with Stellar.org
and KlickEx Group, IBM has operated a cross-currency payment
solution since October 2017, which processes transactions among
partners in the APFII organization in the Pacific region [15]. The
Fabric blockchain records financial payments in the form of trans-
actions endorsed by the participants, together with the conditions
they agree on. All appropriate parties have access and insight into
the clearing and settlement of financial transactions.
The solution is designed for all payment types and values, and
allows financial institutions to choose the settlement network. In
particular, settlement may use different methods, and Fabric makes
a decision on how to settle a payment, depending on the configura-
tion of the participants. One possible kind of settlement is through
Lumens (Stellar’s cryptocurrency), other ways are based on the
type of the traded financial instrument.
7 RELATEDWORK
The architecture of Fabric resembles that of a middleware-replicated
database as pioneered by Kemme and Alonso [40]. However, all
existing work on this addressed only crash failures, not the setting
of distributed trust that corresponds to a BFT system. For instance, a
replicated databasewith asymmetric update processing [41, Sec. 6.3]
relies on one node to execute each transaction, which would not
work on a blockchain. The execute-order-validate architecture of
Fabric can be interpreted as a generalization of this work to the
Byzantine model, with practical applications to distributed ledgers.
Byzantium [32] and HRDB [55] are two further predecessors of
Fabric from the viewpoint of BFT database replication. Byzantium
allows transactions to run in parallel and uses active replication,
but totally orders BEGIN and COMMIT/ROLLBACK using a BFT
middleware. In its optimistic mode, every operation is coordinated
by a single master replica; if the master is suspected to be Byzantine,
all replicas execute the transaction operations for the master and it
triggers a costly protocol to change the master. HRDB relies in an
even stronger way on a correct master. In contrast to Fabric, both
systems use active replication, cannot handle a flexible trust model,
and rely on deterministic operations.
In Eve [37] a related architecture for BFT SMR has also been
explored. Its peers execute transactions concurrently and then ver-
ify that they all reach the same output state, using a consensus
protocol. If the states diverge, they roll back and execute operations
sequentially. Eve contains the element of independent execution,
which also exists in Fabric, but offers none of its other features.
A large number of distributed ledger platforms in the permis-
sioned model have come out recently, which makes it impossi-
ble to compare to all (some prominent ones are Tendermint [14],
Quorum [13], Chain Core [4], Multichain [12], Hyperledger Saw-
tooth [9], the Volt proposal [50], and more, see references in recent
overviews [24, 30]). All platforms follow the order-execute architec-
ture, as discussed in Section 2. As a representative example, take the
Quorum platform [35], an enterprise-focused version of Ethereum.
With its consensus based on Raft [45], it disseminates a transaction
to all peers using gossip and the Raft leader (called minter) assem-
bles valid transactions to a block, and distributes this using Raft.
All peers execute the transaction in the order decided by the leader.
Therefore it suffers from the limitations mentioned in Sections 1–2.
8 CONCLUSION
Fabric is a modular and extensible distributed operating system
for running permissioned blockchains. It introduces a novel ar-
chitecture that separates transaction execution from consensus
and enables policy-based endorsement and that is reminiscent of
middleware-replicated databases.
Through its modularity, Fabric is well-suited for many further im-
provements and investigations. Future work will address (1) perfor-
mance by exploring benchmarks and optimizations, (2) scalability
to large deployments, (3) consistency guarantees and more general
data models, (4) other resilience guarantees through different con-
sensus protocols, (5) privacy and confidentiality for transactions
and ledger data through cryptographic techniques, and much more.
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